Case law framework; factor structure: 5. Within its court-finding-of-domestic-violence context, §109(c)(3) bars weighing an absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s violence against the parent in custody or visitation.
Authority
16 V.I.C. § 109; James v. Faust, 65 V.I. 349 (V.I. 2016)
Source framework
Case law
Factor structure
5
Operative language
mandatory if relevant
Catch-all language
expressly non-exhaustive
Presumptions in the original survey
When a marriage is declared void or dissolved, § 109(a) permits future-custody orders for minor children of the marriage. In that setting, a court finding of domestic violence raises a rebuttable presumption favoring the child’s residence with the nonperpetrator parent in that parent’s chosen location within or outside the territory, or with a legal guardian (§ 109(b)). The text also applies the presumption when a parent has been convicted for the other parent’s death or the child was conceived by rape.
Breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood the marriage can be preserved. The same statutory basis permits legal separation.
Authority
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 104, 106, 109. Act No. 3418, § 1 (1973), and the Superior Court’s Virgin Islands Law Component.
Grounds without a misconduct showing
Breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood the marriage can be preserved. The same statutory basis permits legal separation.
Other grounds and proof conditions
No additional misconduct grounds in § 104.
Separation
No prescribed separation period in § 104.
Timing
The six-week requirement in § 106 is residence, not a post-filing waiting period. Section 109 addresses relief in the decree, including financial and property orders. No separate fixed cooling-off period identified.
Relief without dissolution
Yes, § 104 authorizes "a decree granting a legal separation" on the same standard
No generally applicable relocation notice procedure identified. Section 109(b) separately provides a conditional residence presumption in its marriage/future-custody setting; §109(c)(3) addresses violence-caused absence or relocation. No general relocation burden allocation identified.
Authority
Case law (Jung 2013, James 2016)
Court test
general best-interest factors (no relocation-specific list)
Burden classification
no general relocation allocation identified
Notice classification
no
Trigger classification
no general distance or duration trigger identified; conditional residence provisions apply
Effect of silence
No general deemed-consent procedure identified; court and order terms remain separate
What the court weighs
Jung (2013) stated that no V.I. statute supplied relocation or custody factors. Separately, §109(b) supplies a conditional child-residence presumption in its subsection (a) future-custody setting, and §109(c)(3) addresses relocation caused by the other parent’s domestic violence. The court declined to adopt ALI Principles sec. 2.17 or other states' relocation tests, saying the choice of criteria is for the Legislature, and affirmed permission to relocate under abuse-of-discretion review (additional findings would have been "helpful and even desirable"). Cabret, J., dissented. James (2016): the Superior Court must consider, if relevant, at least a set of factors, the first being the home environments "including the degree to which relocation between those respective environments will impact the child's best interests" (citing Jung), under the Tutein two-step (state the factors, explain the findings). Chinnery (2026) affirmed a primary-custody award after applying best-interest factors to unresolved school and related weekday-residence issues in a dispute involving a relocation motion and a partial mediated settlement agreement.
Who carries the burden
Unclear. No V.I. Supreme Court decision allocating a relocation burden was identified in the original survey. Jung declined to adopt ALI or other-state burden rules. Chinnery’s procedural account states that the September 2024 status-quo order followed, in part, Hill’s failure to establish her burden on her emergency relocation motion; the opinion does not specify a relocation burden standard or decide its general allocation.
Notice and safety exceptions
No generally applicable separate relocation notice rule identified. Section 109(b) provides a conditional residence presumption and §109(c)(3) addresses a violence-related absence or relocation; neither is a general notice procedure.
Which moves trigger the rule
No general distance or duration trigger identified. Section 109(b) supplies a conditional child-residence presumption in future-custody determinations under subsection (a); §109(c)(3) addresses absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s domestic violence. Relocation also reaches the court in the specific motion or custody contexts described in Jung and Chinnery.
Objections and the effect of silence
None found by rule in the original survey. In Chinnery, the other parent filed an opposition to the relocation motion (Chinnery: King's August 1, 2024 opposition).
The modification threshold
A substantial change in circumstances is required before custody is modified: James I, 62 V.I. 554 (2015), citing Jung, 59 V.I. at 1066-67 (Cabret, J., dissenting, noting the majority acknowledged the rule). In Jung the mother's job loss and move were treated as the change and the modification was affirmed. No decision says whether a proposed relocation alone suffices.
Other qualifications
Section 109(b) provides a conditional rebuttable child-residence presumption, including the nonperpetrator parent’s chosen location within or outside the territory, in the future-custody determination under subsection (a) when a marriage is declared void or dissolved. It also applies upon conviction of a parent for the other parent’s death or conception of the child by rape. Within its court-finding-of-domestic-violence context, §109(c)(3) bars weighing an absence or relocation caused by the other parent’s violence against the parent in custody or visitation. These provisions are distinct from a generally applicable relocation notice procedure.
Important qualification
The survey relies on Supreme Court opinions and reproduced statutory text. The reproduced 2025 and 2026-labeled code texts do not rule out later enactments. The opinions do not settle a general relocation burden.
Burden summary
No general allocation identified
Notice summary
No separate relocation notice rule found; consent or court permission may still be required
Trigger summary
No general threshold identified; conditional residence rules apply
